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a b s t r a c t
Based on the Pawlak rough set theory, this paper investigates separations in covering
approximation spaces, give some characterizations of these separations and some relations
among these separations. As an application of these results, investigations on network
security are converted into investigations on separations in covering approximation spaces
by taking covering approximation spaces as mathematical models of networks. Results of
this paper give further applications of the Pawlak rough set theory in pattern recognition
and artificial intelligence, which makes it possible to research network security by logical
methods and mathematical methods in computer science. This contributes to giving risk
assessments of securities and to raise grades of securities for networks.
© 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In this paper, a network is a pair (V ;B), whereB is a family of servers and V is a set of their users, such that each server in
B provides its service to some users in V and each user in V accepts some services from some servers inB. In such a network
(V ;B), how to protect users’ privacy? In other words, how to guarantee that a user (or some users) is not interfered with
by some other users? It is interesting to consider the above question. More specifically, the following properties are worthy
to be investigated.
Definition 1.1. Let (V ;B) be a network.
(1) S0-security: For each pair of distinct users x and y in V , there is a server E in B providing its service exactly to one of x
and y.
(2) S1-security: For each pair of distinct users x and y in V , there are servers E1 and E2 inB providing their services to x and
y but not providing their services to y and x, respectively.
(3) S2-security: For each pair of distinct users x and y in V , there are servers E1 and E2 inB providing their services to x and
y respectively such that no user in V accepts services of both E1 and E2.
(4) S3-security: For each user x in V and each subset V ′ of V not containing x, there is a server E in B providing its service
to x and not providing its service to any user in V ′.
(5) Sr -security: For each user x in V and for each server E inB providing its service to x, E provides its service to all users in
V − Vx, where Vx be a subset of V such that y is a user in Vx if and only if there is a server E inB providing its service to
y and not providing its service to x.
Remark 1.2. Sr -security in Definition 1.1(5) may be complicated and lengthy. However, Sr -security is indeed hidden in
networks (see Section 4).
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How to investigate the above securities in a network (V ;B)? It is necessary to analyze voluminous data collected
from (V ;B). In information science, in order to extract useful information hidden in voluminous data, many methods
in addition to classical logic and classical mathematics have been proposed. rough-set theory, which was proposed by
Pawlak in [1], plays an important role in applications of these methods. Their usefulness has been demonstrated by
many successful applications in pattern recognition and artificial intelligence [2–13]. In the past years, rough set theory
was also an effective tool in the research of network security in particular. Zhu, Premkumar, Zhang and Chu [14] gave
a comparison to show that rough sets provide better accuracy within data mining methods, where data are collected
by network intrusion detection systems. Cai, Guan, Shao, Peng and Sun [15] presented an effective method for anomaly
intrusion detection with low overhead and high efficiency based on rough set theory. Bae, Lee and Lee [16] presented an
efficient rough set based anomaly detection method that can effectively identify a group of especially harmful internal
attackers-masqueraders in cellular mobile networks. Yao, Zhao and Fan [17] propose an enhanced SVM model, which
outperformed the conventional SVM in precision, computation time and false negative rate. Rough set theory is adopted to
perform a feature ranking and selection task of the enhanced SVM model. Naturally, it is a significative work to investigate
the Si-security (i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r) in networks by using rough-set theory. Note that in the past years, with development
of computer science, applications of rough-set theory have been extended from Pawlak approximation spaces to covering
approximation spaces (see [18–30], for example). In this paper,we investigate separations in covering approximation spaces,
give some characterizations of these separations and some relations among these separations. As investigations of network
security, we take covering approximation spaces as mathematical models of networks to convert investigations on network
security into investigations on separations in covering approximation spaces. These results give further applications of rough
set theory in pattern recognition and artificial intelligence, which makes it possible to research network security by logical
methods and mathematical methods in computer science.
2. Preliminaries
Definition 2.1 ([30]). Let U , the universe of discourse, be a finite set and U be a family of nonempty subsets of U .
(1) U is called a cover of U if
⋃{K : K ∈ U } = U .
(2) The pair (U;U ) is called a covering approximation space if U is a cover of U .
Definition 2.2 ([21]). Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space.
(1) U is called a partition on U if K
⋂
K ′ = ∅ for all K , K ′ ∈ U , where K 6= K ′.
(2) (U;U ) is called a Pawlak approximation space if U is a partition on U .
Notation 2.3. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Throughout this paper, we use the following notations, where
x ∈ U, X ⊂ U andF ⊂ 2U .
(1)
⋂
F =⋂{F : F ∈ F }.
(2)
⋃
F =⋃{F : F ∈ F }.
(3) Ux = {K : x ∈ K ∈ U }.
(4) N(x) =⋂{K : K ∈ U x} =⋂U x.
(5) D(x) = U −⋃(U −U x).
The following proposition can be obtained immediately from Definition 2.1.
Proposition 2.4. Let (V ;B) be a network. For each server E in B, let VE be a set of some users in V such that x is a user in VE
if and only if E provides its service to x. Put U is the abstract set of V and KE is the abstract set of VE for each E ∈ B. Then
U = {KE : E ∈ B} is a cover of U, and so (U;U ) is a covering approximation space.
Definition 2.5. Let (V ;B) and (U;U ) be stated as Proposition 2.4. Then (U;U ) is called a covering approximation space
induced by (V ;B).
Now we give separations in covering approximation spaces, which correspond to securities in networks (see Proposi-
tion 2.7). Ideas of these separations come from topology (see [31,32], for example)
Definition 2.6. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. (U;U ) is called an S0- (resp. S1-, S2-, S3-, Sr -) covering
approximation space if (U;U ) satisfies the following S0- (resp. S1-, S2-, S3-, Sr -) separation axiom.
(1) S0-separation axiom: x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ ∃K ∈ U (K⋂{x, y} = {x}∨ K⋂{x, y} = {y}).
(2) S1-separation axiom: x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ ∃Kx, Ky ∈ U (Kx⋂{x, y} = {x}∧ Ky⋂{x, y} = {y}).
(3) S2-separation axiom: x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ ∃Kx, Ky ∈ U (x ∈ Kx∧ y ∈ Ky∧ Kx⋂ Ky = ∅).
(4) S3-separation axiom: x ∈ U∧ x 6∈ X ⊂ U H⇒ ∃K ∈ U (x ∈ K∧ K⋂ X = ∅).
(5) Sr -separation axiom: x ∈ K ∈ U H⇒ D(x) ⊂ K .
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Throughout this paper, Si-covering approximation space is abbreviated to be called Si-space, i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r .
Proposition 2.7. Let (V ;B) be a network and (U;U ) be a covering approximation space induced by (V ;B). Then (V ;B) has
Si-security if and only if (U;U ) is an Si-space for each i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r.
Proof. We only prove the S0-case. Other proofs are similar.
Necessity: Suppose that (V ;B) has S0-security. Let x, y ∈ U and x 6= y. Since (U;U ) is induced by (V ;B), x and y can
be seen as a pair of distinct users in V . So there is a server E in B providing its service exactly to one of x and y. Without
loss of generality, we assume that E provides its service to x but does not provide its service to y. Put VE = {z ∈ V : E
provides its service to z} and K is the abstract set of VE . Then K ∈ U and K⋂{x, y} = {x}. So (U;U ) is an S0-space.
Sufficiency: Suppose that (U;U ) is an S0-space. Let x and y be a pair of distinct users in V . Since (U;U ) is induced by
(V ;B), x and y can be seen as a pair of distinct points in U . So there is K ∈ U such that K⋂{x, y} = {x} or K⋂{x, y}
= {y}. Without loss of generality, we assume that K⋂{x, y} = {x}. Then there is a server E ∈ B such that VE = {z ∈ V :
E provides its service to z} and K is the abstract set of VE . Thus E provides its service to x but does not provide its service to
y. So (U;B) has S0-security. 
By Proposition 2.7, our investigations can be converted from securities in networks into separations in covering
approximation spaces. In order to investigate these separations in covering approximation spaces by means of rough sets,
we need the following definition, which belongs to Qin, Gao and Pei [21].
Definition 2.8. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. For each X ⊂ U , Put
C(X) =
⋃
{N(x) : x ∈ X};
C(X) = {x ∈ U : ∀u(x ∈ N(u) −→ u ∈ X)}.
(1) C : 2U −→ 2U is called covering upper approximation operator.
(2) C : 2U −→ 2U is called covering lower approximation operator.
(3) C(X) is called a covering upper approximation of X , which is abbreviated to X∗.
(4) C(X) is called a covering lower approximation of X , which is abbreviated to X∗.
(5) X is called a definable set of (U;U ) if X∗ = X∗.
(6) X is called a rough set of (U;U ) if X∗ 6= X∗.
By Definition 2.8, we have the following remark immediately.
Remark 2.9. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space and x ∈ U .
(1) {x}∗ = N(x).
(2) y ∈ {x}∗ ⇐⇒ If u ∈ U and y ∈ N(u), then u = x.
3. Characterization of separations
Lemma 3.1 ([21]). Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following hold.
(1) U∗ = U∗ = U and ∅∗ = ∅∗ = ∅.
(2) X ⊂ U H⇒ X∗ ⊂ X ⊂ X∗.
(3) X ⊂ U H⇒ (X∗)∗ = X∗∧(X∗)∗ = X∗.
(4) X ⊂ Y ⊂ U H⇒ X∗ ⊂ Y∗∧ X∗ ⊂ Y ∗.
(5) X, Y ⊂ U H⇒ (X⋂ Y)∗ = X∗⋂ Y∗∧(X⋃ Y)∗ = X∗⋃ Y ∗.
Lemma 3.2. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space and x, y ∈ U. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) x ∈ N(y).
(2) Uy⊂ U x.
(3) N(x) ⊂ N(y).
(4) D(y) ⊂ D(x).
(5) y ∈ D(x).
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2): Let x ∈ N(y) =⋂{K : K ∈ U y}. Then for each K ∈ U y, x ∈ K , and so K ∈ U x. Consequently, Cy⊂ U x.
(2)H⇒ (3): Let Cy⊂ U x. Then N(x) =⋂{K : K ∈ U x} ⊂⋂{K : K ∈ U y} = N(y).
(3)H⇒ (1): Let N(x) ⊂ N(y). Then x ∈ N(x) ⊂ N(y).
(2)H⇒ (4): Let Cy⊂ U x. Then U − Cx ⊂ U −U y, and hence⋃(U − Cx) ⊂⋃(U −U y). So D(y) = U −⋃(U − Cy) ⊂
U − (U −U x) = D(x).
(4)H⇒ (5): Let D(y) ⊂ D(x). Then y ∈ D(y) ⊂ D(x).
(5)H⇒ (2): Let y ∈ D(x). Then y 6∈ ⋃(U −U x). So y 6∈ K for each K ∈ U −U x, i.e., for each K ∈ U , K 6∈ U y if K 6∈ U x.
Consequently, if K ∈ U y, then K ∈ U x. This proves that Uy⊂ U x. 
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Theorem 3.3. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an Sr -space.
(2) K ∈ U H⇒ K = K∗.
(3) ∀x, y ∈ U(x ∈ {y}∗ H⇒ y ∈ {x}∗).
(4) ∀x, y ∈ U(x 6∈ {y}∗ H⇒ y 6∈ {x}∗).
Proof. (1) H⇒ (2): Suppose that (U;U ) is an Sr -space. Let K ∈ U . Then K∗ ⊂ K by Lemma 3.1(2). We only need to prove
that K ⊂ K∗. If x ∈ K , then D(x) ⊂ K . For each u ∈ U such that x ∈ N(u), it suffices to prove that u ∈ K . In fact, x ∈ N(u), so
D(u) ⊂ D(x) by Lemma 3.2, and hence u ∈ D(u) ⊂ D(x) ⊂ K .
(2) H⇒ (3): Suppose that (2) holds. Let x, y ∈ U and x ∈ {y}∗. Then x ∈ N(y) by Remark 2.9(1). In order to prove that
y ∈ {x}∗ = N(x), It suffices to prove that y ∈ K for each K ∈ U x. Let K ∈ U x, then x ∈ K = K∗. So for each u ∈ U , if x ∈ N(u),
then u ∈ K . Note that x ∈ N(y). It follows that y ∈ K .
(3) H⇒ (1): Suppose that (3) holds. Let x ∈ K ∈ U and y ∈ D(x). It suffices to prove that y ∈ K . By Lemma 2.9(1),
x ∈ N(y) = {y}∗. So y ∈ {y}∗ = N(x). Note that K ∈ U x. It follows that y ∈ N(x) ⊂ K .
(3)⇐⇒ (4): It is clear. 
Remark 3.4. Anyway, it is trivial that any partition on the universe U of discourse is also a cover of U . It is known that
K = K∗ for each K ∈ U for the Pawlak approximation space (U;U ) (see [21,30], for example). So condition K = K∗ is a
necessary condition but not a sufficient one to define a Pawlak approximation space. Thus each Pawlak approximation space
is an Sr -space by Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.5. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S0-space.
(2) x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ x 6∈ {y}∗∨ y 6∈ {x}∗.
(3) x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ {x}∗ 6= {y}∗.
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2): Suppose that (U;U ) is an S0-space. Let x, y ∈ U and x 6= y. Without loss of generality, we assume that
there is K ∈ U such that K⋂{x, y} = {x}, then y 6∈ K ∈ U x, and so y 6∈ N(x) = {x}∗.
(2) H⇒ (3): Suppose that (2) holds. Let x, y ∈ U and x 6= y. Without loss of generality, we assume that x 6∈ {y}∗. Note
that x ∈ {x}∗ by Lemma 3.1(2). So {x}∗ 6= {y}∗.
(3) H⇒ (1): Suppose that (3) holds. Let x, y ∈ U and x 6= y. Then {x}∗ 6= {y}∗, i.e., N(x) 6= N(y). Without loss of
generality, we assume that N(x) 6⊂ N(y). Then x 6∈ N(y) by Lemma 3.2, and hence there is K ∈ U y such that x 6∈ K . It follows
that K
⋂{x, y} = {y}. This proves that (U;U ) is an S0-space. 
Theorem 3.6. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(2) x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ x 6∈ {y}∗∧ y 6∈ {x}∗.
(3) x ∈ U H⇒ {x} = {x}∗.
(4) x ∈ U H⇒ {x} = {x}∗.
(5) X ⊂ U H⇒ X = X∗.
(6) X ⊂ U H⇒ X = X∗.
(7) x ∈ U H⇒ {x} = N(x).
(8) x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ N(x)⋂N(y) = ∅.
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2): It holds by the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.5(1)H⇒ (2).
(2) H⇒ (3): Suppose that (2) holds. Let x ∈ U , then {x} ⊂ {x}∗ by Lemma 3.1(2). On the other hand, if y ∈ {x}∗, then
y = x by (2). So {x}∗ ⊂ {x}. It follows that {x} = {x}∗.
(3) H⇒ (1): Suppose that (3) holds. Let x, y ∈ U and x 6= y. Then y 6∈ {x} = {x}∗ = N(x). So there is Kx ∈ U x such that
y 6∈ Kx, and hence Kx⋂{x, y} = {x}. In the same way, there is Ky ∈ U y such that x 6∈ Ky, and hence Ky⋂{x, y} = {y}. It
follows that (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(3)H⇒ (5): Suppose that (3) holds. Let X ⊂ U . By Lemma 3.1(5), X∗ = (⋃{{x} : x ∈ X})∗ = ⋃{{x}∗ : x ∈ X} = ⋃{{x} :
x ∈ X} = X .
(5)H⇒ (3): It is clear.
(3)⇐⇒ (7): It holds by Remark 2.9(1).
(7)H⇒ (8): Suppose that (7) holds. Let x, y ∈ U and x 6= y. Then N(x)⋂N(y) = {x}⋂{y} = ∅.
(8) H⇒ (7): Suppose that (8) holds. Let x ∈ U . If {x} 6= N(x), then there is y ∈ N(x) such that y 6= x. Thus y ∈
N(x)
⋂
N(y) 6= ∅. This is a contradiction.
(7)H⇒ (6): Suppose that (7) holds. Let X ⊂ U . By Lemma 3.1(2), X∗ ⊂ X . It suffices to prove that X ⊂ X∗. Let x ∈ X . For
each u ∈ U , if x ∈ N(u) = {u}, then u = x ∈ X . So x ∈ X∗. This proves that X ⊂ X∗.
(6)H⇒ (4): It is clear.
(4)H⇒ (7): Suppose that (4) holds. Let x ∈ U . It suffices to proves that N(x) ⊂ {x}. For each y ∈ N(x), y ∈ {y} = {y}∗. By
Remark 2.9(2), if u ∈ U and y ∈ N(u), then y = u. Consequently, y = x since y ∈ N(x). This proves that N(x) ⊂ {x}. 
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Before characterize S2-spaces, we give a lemma.
Lemma 3.7. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then K = K ∗ for each K ∈ U .
Proof. Let K ∈ U . If x ∈ K ∗, then there is y ∈ K such that x ∈ N(y). So x ∈ K ′ for each K ′ ∈ U y. Note that K ∈ U y. It follows
that x ∈ K . This proves that K ∗ ⊂ K . On the other hand, K ⊂ K ∗ by Lemma 3.1(2). Consequently, K = K ∗. 
Theorem 3.8. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S2-space.
(2) x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ ∃K , L ∈ U (x ∈ K∧ y ∈ L∧ K ∗⋂ L∗ = ∅).
(3) x, y ∈ U∧ x 6= y H⇒ ∃K , L ∈ U (x ∈ K∧ y ∈ L∧ K∗⋂ L∗ = ∅) and (U;U ) is an Sr -space.
Proof. (1)⇐⇒ (2): It holds by Lemma 3.7.
(1) H⇒ (3): Suppose that (U;U ) is an S2-space. It is clear that (U;U ) is an S1-space. By Theorem 3.6, K = K∗ for each
K ∈ U . By Theorem 3.3, (U;U ) is an Sr -space, furthermore, (3) holds.
(3)H⇒ (1): It holds by Theorem 3.3. 
Remark 3.9. ‘‘(U;U ) is an Sr -space’’ in Theorem 3.8(3) cannot be omitted.
Proof. Let U = {a, b, c} and U = {{a, b}, {a, c}}. It is easy to see that (U;U ) is not an S2-space. Note that N(a) = {a},
N(b) = {a, b} and N(c) = {a, c}. Since a ∈ N(c) and c 6∈ {a, b}, a 6∈ {a, b}∗. On the other hand, for any u ∈ U , if b ∈ N(u),
then u = b. By Remark 2.9(2) and Lemma 3.1(4), b ∈ {b}∗ ⊂ {a, b}∗. So {a, b}∗ = {b}. In the same way, {a, c}∗ = {c}. It
follows that (U;U ) satisfies Theorem 3.8(3) except that (U;U ) is an Sr -space. 
In order to obtain characterizations for S3-spaces, we need the following definition, which comes from [18,21].
Definition 3.10. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space.
(1) For x ∈ K ∈ U , x is called a representative element of K if ∀S ∈ U (x ∈ S H⇒ K ⊂ S).
(2) C0 is the set of all representative elements of sets of the covering U , that is
C0 =
{
x : ∃K ∈ U
(
x ∈ K
∧
∀S ∈ U (x ∈ S H⇒ K ⊂ S)
)}
.
(3) (U;U ) is called a C0-space if C0 = U .
Remark 3.11. (1) Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Let x ∈ K ∈ U . x is a representative element of K if and
only if N(x) = K [18,21].
(2) It is clear that each Pawlak approximation space is a C0-space.
Lemma 3.12. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is a C0-space.
(2) x ∈ U H⇒ {x}∗ ∈ U .
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2): Suppose that (U;U ) is a C0-space. Let x ∈ U . Then there is K ∈ U such that x is a representative element
of K . By Remark 2.9(1) and Remark 3.11(1), {x}∗ = N(x) = K ∈ U .
(2)H⇒ (1): Suppose that {x}∗ ∈ U for each x ∈ U . If x ∈ U , then x is a representative element of {x}∗ by Remark 2.9(1)
and Remark 3.11(1). Consequently, C0 = U . It follows that (U;U ) is a C0-space. 
Theorem 3.13. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S3-space.
(2) x ∈ U H⇒ {x} ∈ U .
(3) (U;U ) is an S2-space and {{x}∗ : x ∈ U} ⊂ U .
(4) (U;U ) is an S2- and C0-space.
(5) (U;U ) is an S1- and C0-space.
(6) (U;U ) is an S1-space and {{x}∗ : x ∈ U} ⊂ U .
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2): Suppose that (U;U ) is an S3-space. Let x ∈ U . Then x 6∈ U − {x}, so there is K ∈ U such that x ∈ K and
K
⋂
(U − {x}) = ∅. Thus K = {x}, and so {x} ∈ U .
(2) H⇒ (3): Suppose that (2) holds. Let x, y ∈ U and x 6= y. Then x ∈ {x}, y ∈ {y}, {x}, {y} ∈ U and {x}⋂{y} = ∅. So
(U;U ) is an S2-space. On the other hand, for each x ∈ U , it is clear thatN(x) = {x} as {x} ∈ U , and so {x}∗ = N(x) = {x} ∈ U .
(3)H⇒ (4): It holds by Lemma 3.12.
(4)H⇒ (5): It is clear.
(5)H⇒ (6): It holds by Lemma 3.12.
(6) H⇒ (1): Suppose that (6) holds. Let x ∈ U and x 6∈ X ⊂ U . Then {x}⋂ X = ∅. By Theorem 3.6, {x} = {x}∗ ∈ U . So
(U;U ) is an S3-space. 
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Remark 3.14. ‘‘S1-’’ in Theorem 3.13(5), (6) cannot be relaxed to ‘‘S0-’’ or ‘‘Sr -’’ (see Examples 4.12 and 4.14 in next section).
In this section, we have obtained some characterizations of Si-spaces for each i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r . It is easy to apply these
results to networks. Specially, for each i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r , we can investigate whether a network has Si-security. In fact, let
(V ;B) be a network and i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r . Adopting the method stated in Proposition 2.4, we can construct a covering
approximation space (U;U ). By characterizations of Si-spaces, it can be known whether (U;U ) is an Si-space. Note that
(V ;B) has Si-security if and only if (U;U ) is an Si-space. It follows that (V ;B) has Si-security or not. Clearly, the above
method is a ‘‘nice’’ method. For example, it is easy to knownwhether a covering approximation space induced by a network
is an S1-space by Theorem 3.6. However, it is not easy to investigate whether the network has S1-security by the definition
of S1-security. An example of concrete applications is given in Section 5.
4. Relations among separations
Theorem 4.1. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Consider the following condition.
(1) (U;U ) is an S3-space.
(2) (U;U ) is an S2-space.
(3) (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(4) (U;U ) is an S0-space.
(5) (U;U ) is an Sr -space.
Then (1)H⇒ (2)H⇒ (3)H⇒ (4) and (3)H⇒ (5).
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2): It holds by Theorem 3.13.
(2)H⇒ (3)H⇒ (4): They are clear.
(3) H⇒ (5): Suppose that (U;U ) is an S1-space. For each K ∈ U , K = K∗ by Theorem 3.6. So (U;U ) is an Sr -space by
Theorem 3.3. 
Remark 4.2. None of implications in Theorem 4.1 can be reversed (see the following examples), but we have the following
two theorems.
Theorem 4.3. Let (U;U ) be a covering approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(2) (U;U ) is an S0- and Sr -space.
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2): It holds by Theorem 4.1.
(2)H⇒ (1): It holds by Theorems 3.3, 3.5 and 3.6. 
Theorem 4.4. Let (U;U ) be a Pawlak approximation space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S3-space.
(2) (U;U ) is an S2-space.
(3) (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(4) (U;U ) is an S0-space.
(5) U = {{x} : x ∈ U}.
Proof. (1)H⇒ (2)H⇒ (3)H⇒ (4): They are hold by Theorem 4.1.
(4) H⇒ (5): Suppose that (U;U ) is an S0-space. Let x ∈ U . It suffices to prove that {x} ∈ U . Since U is a cover of U ,
there is Kx ∈ U such that x ∈ Kx. If {x} 6∈ U , then Kx 6= {x}, and hence there is y ∈ Kx and y 6= x. Thus Kx⋂{x, y} = {x, y}.
On the other hand, since (U;U ) is a Pawlak approximation space, U is a partition on U , and hence K⋂{x, y} = ∅ for each
K ∈ U − {Kx}. This contradicts that (U;U ) is an S0-space. It follows that {x} ∈ U .
(5)H⇒ (1): It holds by Theorem 3.13. 
Remark 4.5. We know that each Pawlak approximation space is an Sr - and C0-space by Remarks 3.4 and 3.11(2). Can
‘‘Pawlak approximation space’’ in Theorem 4.4 be relaxed to ‘‘Sr - and C0-space’’? It is clear that the answer of this question
is negative. However, we show that (1), (2), (3), (4) in Theorem 4.4 are equivalent to ‘‘U ⊃ {{x} : x ∈ U}’’ if (U;U ) is an
Sr - and C0-space.
The following two lemmas are straight corollaries of Theorems 4.3 and 3.13 respectively.
Lemma 4.6. Let (U;U ) be an Sr -space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S0-space.
(2) (U;U ) is an S1-space.
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Lemma 4.7. Let (U;U ) be a C0-space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(2) (U;U ) is an S2-space.
(3) (U;U ) is an S3-space.
(4) U ⊃ {{x} : x ∈ U}.
Remark 4.8. We cannot add ‘‘(U;U ) is an S0-space’’ or ‘‘(U;U ) is an Sr -space’’ in equivalent conditions of Lemma 4.7
(see the following Examples 4.12 and 4.14).
By Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4.9. Let (U;U ) be an Sr - and C0-space. Then the following are equivalent.
(1) (U;U ) is an S3-space.
(2) (U;U ) is an S2-space.
(3) (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(4) (U;U ) is an S0-space.
(5) U ⊃ {{x} : x ∈ U}.
Now we give some examples.
Example 4.10. S2-space 6H⇒ S3-space.
Proof. Let U = {a, b, c, d}, and U = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {c, d}, {b, d}}.
(1) It is not difficult to check that (U;U ) is an S2-space.
(2) {a} 6∈ U , so (U;U ) is not an S3-space by Theorem 3.13. 
Example 4.11. S1-space 6H⇒ S2-space.
Proof. Let U = {a, b, c}, and U = {{a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}}. Then {a}∗ = N(a) = {a}, {b}∗ = N(b) = {b} and {c}∗ = N(c)
= {c}.
(1) Since {a}∗ = {a}, {b}∗ = {b} and {c}∗ = {c}, (U;U ) is an S1-space by Theorem 3.6.
(2) It is not difficult to check that K
⋂
L 6= ∅ for any K , L ∈ U . So (U;U ) is not an S2-space. 
Example 4.12. S0- and C0-space 6H⇒ S1-space.
Proof. Let U = {a, b}, and U = {{a}, {a, b}}. Then {a}∗ = N(a) = {a}, {b}∗ = N(b) = {a, b}.
(1) Since {a}∗ = {a} 6= {a, b} = {b}∗, (U;U ) is an S0-space by Theorem 3.5.
(2) Since {a}∗ = {a} ∈ U and {b}∗ = {a, b} ∈ U , (U;U ) is a C0-space by Lemma 3.12.
(3) Since {b}∗ = {a, b} 6= {b}, (U;U ) is not an S1-space by Theorem 3.6. 
Example 4.13. S0-space 6H⇒ Sr -space.
Proof. Let U = {a, b, c}, and U = {{a, c}, {b, c}}. Then {a}∗ = N(a) = {a, c}, {b}∗ = N(b) = {b, c} and {c}∗ = N(c) = {c}.
(1) Since {a}∗ 6= {b}∗ 6= {c}∗ 6= {a}∗, (U;U ) is an S0-space by Theorem 3.5.
(2) Since c ∈ {a, c} = {a}∗ and a 6∈ {c} = {c}∗, (U;U ) is not an Sr -space by Theorem 3.3. 
Example 4.14. Sr - and C0-space 6H⇒ S0-space.
Proof. Let U = {a, b}, andU = {{a, b}}. Then (U;U ) is a Pawlak approximation space, and so (U;U ) is an Sr - and C0-space
by Remarks 3.4 and 3.11(2). It is clear that (U;U ) is not an S0-space. 
In this section, we have obtained the following implications by Theorems 4.1 and 4.3: S3-spaces H⇒ S2-spaces H⇒
S1-spaces⇐⇒ S0- and Sr -spaces. In addition, examples in this section show that none of other implications holds among
S0-spaces, S1-spaces, S2-spaces, S3-spaces and Sr -spaces. Converting these results by Propositions 2.4 and 2.7, we have the
following implications: S3-securityH⇒ S2-securityH⇒ S1-security⇐⇒ S0- and Sr -security, and other implications do not
hold.
5. Applications on network security
In this section, we demonstrate applications on network security. At first, we give some steps to obtain the securities of
networks by the separations of covering approximation spaces.
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Step 5.1. Let (V ;B) be a network.
(1) By Proposition 2.4, we convert the network (V ;B) to a covering approximation space (U;U ), where (U;U ) is induced by
(V ;B).
(2) By previous results on separations of covering approximation spaces, we obtain the separation of covering approximation
space (U;U ).
(3) By Proposition 2.7, we convert the separation of (U;U ) to the security of (V ;B).
Now we give an application to show that our approach does work. This work is to assessments securities of a course
examination network in Soochow University.
Application 5.2. A Course Examination Network (V ;B).
(1) Conditions of Network (V ;B).
(1.1) (V ;B) can be applied to a course examination for a group consisting of 30 students in Soochow University.
(1.2) In order to prevent cheats in a course examination, it is necessary to guarantee that every student can only acquire
his/her own exam questions in the network (V ;B). Therefore, the designer of (V ;B) designs that every student x must
accept services from all servers in Bx, where Bx = {E ∈ B : E provides its service tox}. Obviously, it is sufficient if (V ;B)
has S1-security.
(2) Establishment of Network (V ;B).
(2.1) Put V is the set of 30 users: V = {x1, x2, . . . , x30}.
(2.2) PutB is the set 10 servers:B = {E1, E2, . . . , E10}.
(2.3) For each Ek ∈ B (k = 1, 2, . . . , 10), the designer of (V ;B) designs VEk = {x ∈ V : Ek provides its service to x} as
follows.
VE1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6},
VE2 = {x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11},
VE3 = {x11, x12, x13, x14, x15, x16},
VE4 = {x16, x17, x18, x19, x20, x21},
VE5 = {x21, x22, x23, x24, x25, x26},
VE6 = {x26, x27, x28, x29, x30, x1},
VE7 = {x2, x7, x12, x17, x22, x27},
VE8 = {x3, x8, x13, x18, x23, x28},
VE9 = {x4, x9, x14, x19, x24, x29},
VE10 = {x5, x10, x15, x20, x25, x30}.
Thus, a network (V ;B) is established.
(3) Conversion of Network (V ;B).
By Proposition 2.4, we convert the network (V ;B) to a covering approximation space (U;U ) as follows, where (U;U )
is induced by (V ;B).
(3.1) U is the abstract set of V : U = {x1, x2, . . . , x30}.
(3.2) U is a cover of U: U = {K1, K2, . . . , K10}.
K1 = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6},
K2 = {x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11},
K3 = {x11, x12, x13, x14, x15, x16},
K4 = {x16, x17, x18, x19, x20, x21},
K5 = {x21, x22, x23, x24, x25, x26},
K6 = {x26, x27, x28, x29, x30, x1},
K7 = {x2, x7, x12, x17, x22, x27},
K8 = {x3, x8, x13, x18, x23, x28},
K9 = {x4, x9, x14, x19, x24, x29},
K10 = {x5, x10, x15, x20, x25, x30}.
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Thus, a covering approximation space (U;U ) is obtained, which is induced by (V ;B).
(4) Separation of (U;U ).
It is not difficult to check that N(xi) = {xi} for each i = 1, 2, . . . , 30. By Theorem 3.6, (U;U ) is an S1-space.
(5) Security of (V ;B).
By Proposition 2.7, (V ;B) has S1-security.
Remark 5.3. In the establishment of the network (V ;B), we wish that number of servers be reduced as far as possible to
save cost. For example, if we put V = {x1, x2, . . . , x30},B = {E1, E2, . . . , E30} and VEk = {xk} for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 30},
then (V ;B) is not a good course examination network although (V ;B) has S1-security.
6. Conclusion
Let i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r . This paper presents Si-security in networks and Si-separation in covering approximation spaces. We
convert investigations on networks with Si-security into investigations on Si-spaces (covering approximation spaces with
Si-separation), and investigate Si-spaces by rough-set theory. This is helpful for us to establish a network with Si-security
for some i = 0, 1, 2, 3, r . Results of this paper contribute to give risk assessments of securities of a network, and to raise
grades of securities of a network.
One of the future works is the optimization of networks with some security. More precisely, for a set V of users, how
to establish a network (V ;B) with some security such that the number of servers contained in B is a minimum? This
is an interesting research topic, which deals with reduction of covers for covering approximation spaces. In addition,
in the previous sections, we investigate separations in covering approximation spaces based on covering approximation
operators C and C . Because there are also other useful covering approximation operators [20,21,25,26,13,30], it is a
natural question how to investigate separations in corresponding covering approximation spaces with these covering
approximation operators. This is still worthy to be considered in subsequent research.
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